Foto: Ricardo Stuckert/PR

Lula’s third administration revives hunger-combat policies, but limited funding constrains results 

Food procurement programs, public food stocks, and direct incentives for food production have expanded once again, helping Brazil exit the Hunger Map for the second time

When Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva took office for his third term as president of Brazil in January 2023, the landscape left behind by the Temer and Bolsonaro administrations in terms of food-related policies was one of devastation. Since the parliamentary coup that deposed former President Dilma Rousseff in 2016, the country had witnessed the gutting of institutions and programs that had helped Brazil leave the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) Hunger Map in 2014. The country returned to the list in 2022. 

During the three and a half years of his third term, Lula and his team sought to rebuild the institutional framework for food-related policies. The results soon became apparent. Brazil once again left the Hunger Map, supported by advances in policies aimed at promoting food production — amid the expansion of commodity-export agribusiness, which dominates the Brazilian countryside — as well as food procurement and distribution initiatives. According to experts, rural social movements and activists, however, these advances still need to be consolidated and expanded. 

This is also the view of the federal government itself. On several occasions, members of Lula’s administration have referred to the scenario of destruction they encountered in 2023. The reasons behind this assessment are concrete. During the previous seven years, the state’s capacity to fight hunger was almost entirely dismantled.

Michel Temer, who assumed the presidency in 2016 after Rousseff was removed from office, approved a constitutional spending cap that limited the growth of federal expenditures to the previous year’s inflation rate. The measure reduced the state’s investment capacity and directly affected social programs, including policies aimed at combating hunger and promoting healthy diets. 

Temer also abolished the Ministry of Agrarian Development, which had been responsible for coordinating policies targeting family farming. The change weakened the links between food production and consumption and affected programs developed in partnership with rural organizations. 

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The Food Procurement Program (PAA) was another affected policy. Funding allocated to farmers dropped drastically. In 2012, around 176,000 farmers sold their production through the program. By 2017, that number had dropped to just 68,000. The following year, only 53,000 farmers remained in the initiative.

The setbacks deepened under Jair Bolsonaro’s administration. Elected amid an institutional crisis — with Lula imprisoned and barred from running for president due to a lawsuit that would later be annulled by Brazil’s courts — the far-right leader followed Temer’s path. On his very first day in office, Bolsonaro abolished the National Council for Food and Nutrition Security (Consea), a key mechanism linking civil society and the state, an arrangement that had been active since the creation of Fome Zero (Zero Hunger Program) during the first Lula administration (2003–2006). 

The PAA was weakened even further. In 2019, only 44,000 farmers sold their produce to the program. Participation increased slightly during the COVID-19 pandemic — reaching 66,000 farmers in 2020 and 51,000 in 2021 — but fell to its lowest level on record in 2022, when just 18,800 farmers took part.

This entire process took place right before or during the COVID-19 pandemic, creating a perfect storm with dramatic results. A study conducted by the Brazilian Research Network on Food Sovereignty and Food and Nutrition Security (Rede Penssan) found that 33 million people were experiencing hunger in Brazil in 2022. The number of people facing some degree of food insecurity reached 125 million — approximately 58% of the country’s population. 

At the same time, Bolsonaro significantly expanded the weight of congressional earmarks within the federal budget. The result was a transfer of power from the Executive to Congress, reducing the government’s margin to lead national public policies. 

Under his watch, congressional amendments — which are nearly impossible to track — went from 3.95% of discretionary spending in 2014 to 28.7% in 2020, according to a study published by the Brazilian Institute of Economics of the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV Ibre). This scenario weakened the Executive’s capacity to carry out national public policies.  While this was not an issue for the far-right government, it became a major challenge for Lula’s administration.

What has been done? 

The challenge facing Lula’s third administration was even greater than the one he confronted at the start of his first term. In 2003, there had been no institutional rupture. Despite the prevalence of a neoliberal administration under Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the Brazilian state had not been dismantled from within as it was, above all, under Bolsonaro’s government. 

Exactly 20 years later, the institutional structures built during the years of democratic prosperity no longer existed. With the public budget captured by Congress, there was difficulty even in hiring civil servants. The PAA, for instance, struggled under severe budget constraints. Essential both for ensuring that farmers remain in rural areas and for distributing food across the country, the program was reinstated, but with limited resources.

Sílvio Isoppo Porto, president of Conab (National Supply Company), confirmed that the PAA’s biggest challenge today is budgetary. “I have no doubt about Lula’s commitment to the PAA and to policies aimed at fighting hunger. But there is an issue when it comes to funding.”  Conab, along with the MDS (Ministry of Development and Social Assistance) and the Ministry of Agrarian Development and Family Farming (MDA), are the federal government bodies responsible for managing the PAA. Official data show that the PAA reached its lowest point in 2021. That year, the program spent only R$ 18.6 million to purchase 5.2 tonnes of food. The amount spent was 91% lower than in 2020, and the food volume was 92% lower.

In 2022, the final year of the Bolsonaro administration, the figures were not as dire, but still fell well below the program’s historical average. R$ 65.5 million was spent to purchase 17.8 tonnes of food. 

Lula’s return to the presidency in 2023 significantly changed the picture. In its first year, the administration invested R$ 591 million in the PAA — an 800% increase compared with the final year of Bolsonaro’s government — resulting in the acquisition of 86,100 tonnes of food, a 386% rise. 

The following year, only R$ 209 million was disbursed, and 30.6 tonnes of food were bought — a 64% drop in both funds and the volume of food acquired due to budget constraints. Last year, there was a new increase. More than R$ 450 million was allocated to food procurement, the second-highest amount in the PAA’s history. With this, 51 tonnes of food were purchased. Despite the instability, around 136,000 family farmers accessed PAA resources between 2023 and 2025, according to a Conab management balance sheet.

“The PAA is an example of an effective public policy. The problem lies in the way funding for the program is debated in Congress,” said Vânia Marques Pinto, president of the National Confederation of Rural Workers and Family Farmers (Contag), who also supports the initiative because of its positive impact on agriculture. “The role of Congress in defining the budget needs to be reconsidered in light of this pressure for amendments.”

Lula’s third administration also resumed food purchases for public stocks in 2023. At that point, Conab had gone six years without acquiring food supplies. The measure fulfilled an electoral promise made by Lula himself

Since then, however, the status of public stocks has changed little. Today, they hold only a fraction of what they used to store decades ago. For budgetary, operational, and even political reasons, the government has struggled — and continues to struggle — to rebuild the buffer stocks developed over successive administrations to guarantee supplies and soften fluctuations in food prices. Without them, the population — especially poorer households — remains exposed to inflationary shocks affecting staple foods, while farmers, particularly smallholders, are left vulnerable to the ups and downs of agricultural markets.

“There was an investment. But despite the efforts, the result was not as large as we expected and demanded,” summarized Vânia Marques Pinto. She pointed out that public food procurement for stocks was resumed with corn. In 2022, the company held 51,000 tonnes of the grain in its warehouses. 

In June 2023, during the ceremony marking the revival of the public stockpiling policy, Conab announced an investment of R$ 350 million to purchase up to 8.3 million sacks of the cereal. At that time, the company held 47,100 tonnes of the grain in its warehouses. It ended 2023 with 350,000 tonnes stockpiled — an increase of nearly 650%. 

By the end of last year, there were only 119,300 tonnes — 66% less than two years ago and less than one-tenth of the amount stockpiled in 1996, even with the revival of the public stock policy. 

Part of this decline can be explained by Conab’s decision to focus its purchases on rice in 2024. In April and May of that year, a historic flood hit Rio Grande do Sul, a state that produces roughly 70% of the grain harvested in the country. 

Lula took office with Conab’s rice stocks completely depleted. By the end of 2024, the company had 416 tonnes of rice in storage. By the end of last year, that figure had risen to 223,000 tonnes — meaning about 500 times more.

Porto, president of Conab, stated that in 2025 the government decided to intervene in the grain market to guarantee a minimum price for producers and encourage the production of a staple food in the Brazilian diet. Conab made R$ 1 billion available for grain purchases. However, few producers showed interest in the offer. 

According to Porto, some producers disagreed with the proposed price, while others simply did not want to do business with the government. “Political considerations played a role,” he stated.

It may seem contradictory for producers to act against their own economic interests, but this interpretation is supported by public statements. In an interview published by the website Congresso em Foco on March 2, the president of the Parliamentary Agricultural Front (FPA), federal deputy Pedro Lupion (Republicanos-PR), openly declared that the “agribusiness project is to remove the PT from power.” 

This stance persists despite the massive financial support provided by the Lula administration to the agricultural sector. The Plano Safra (Harvest Plan) announced during Bolsonaro’s final year in office — the largest between 2019 and 2022 — provided R$ 251 billion in credit to rural producers. The amount announced by Lula for 2026 reached R$ 516 billion, representing an increase of nearly 60% compared with 2022, after adjusting for inflation based on the IPCA index.

The Conab director added that this was not the only issue faced by the company in rebuilding stocks. He recalled that the Bolsonaro administration closed 27 of the company’s warehouses and failed to carry out necessary maintenance on another 64, reducing the government’s capacity to store food. 

Results 

Despite the hurdles, Brazil has once again seen growth in the production of staple foods. For the first time in at least two decades, a president has overseen an increase — rather than a decline — in the combined production of rice, beans and cassava during a single term in office. 

According to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), in 2011 — the first year of Dilma Rousseff’s administration and Lula’s successor — Brazil produced 43.1 million tonnes of rice, beans and cassava combined, the highest figure in the historical series compiled by the institute. By 2022, the final year of Jair Bolsonaro’s administration, this production had dropped to 31.9 million tonnes, the worst result in the series, over 25% below the figure recorded 11 years earlier.

In 2023, the production volume had already climbed to 32.3 million tonnes. By the end of last year, it had climbed to 35.4 million tonnes — the highest volume since 2017 and nearly 11% above the level registered at the end of Bolsonaro’s term. 

These figures are also the result of favorable circumstances. The increase in rice production is the main driver behind the positive results recorded under Lula’s administration. In 2025, Brazil harvested more than 12.6 million tonnes of rice — the highest output since 2011 and the second-largest volume in the IBGE’s historical series. 

Rice production increased by 18% between 2022 and 2025, driven by the launch of the Programa Arroz da Gente (Our Rice Program) in 2024, as well as by higher prices paid to producers.

According to Porto, Arroz da Gente currently works with 265 communities across 17 states and relies on 82 technical specialists dedicated to expanding rice cultivation. 

Porto stated that the government’s idea is to use the program as a pilot project. If successful, it could pave the way for similar projects focused on other staple foods, including “Feijão da Gente” (Our Beans) and “Mandioca da Gente” (Our Cassava). “We need to increase production in order to make these foods more affordable, develop logistics systems to distribute them and expand cultivation. These are essential components of the Brazilian diet, and they need to remain accessible,” he said.

Since 2023, bean cultivation in the country — considering the three harvests recorded by the IBGE — rose from 2.9 million to 3 million tonnes, a 2% increase. Meanwhile, cassava production grew from 19.1 million to 19.8 million tonnes — a 3% increase. 

One of the challenges to sustaining the cultivation of these foods in the country is competition from soybean crops. Soybean production in Brazil has grown 218% since 2006, according to the IBGE — more than tripled over the period. Corn production increased by 51% in the period. International interest in the commodity makes this a more attractive crop for producers. The land area planted with soybeans in Brazil expanded from 21.9 million hectares in 2006 to 47.7 million hectares — a 117% expansion in 20 years. 

According to Vânia Marques Pinto, a significant portion of this expansion occurred on land previously used to cultivate rice, beans and cassava. Since 2006, the cultivated area devoted to these three crops has declined by 41%, 44% and 46%, respectively, according to IBGE data. 

The results achieved since 2023 indicate that the reconstruction of public policies to combat hunger has yielded positive outcomes. These actions, however, continue to operate within a budget ceiling that is far too low for the country’s needs. 

The 2026 elections — in which Lula is expected to face Flávio Bolsonaro, son of the former president who is now imprisoned for attempting a coup d’état — will be critical for the future of food security in the country.

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